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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIABILITY OF A STATION
OWNER FOR DEFAMATION OVER HIS FACILITIES
BY A POLITICAL CANDIDATE
A North Dakota senatorial candidate, during the course of a
campaign speech over the facilities of the defendant television station, accused the plaintiff of conspiring to "establish a Communist
Farmers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota." The Farmers
Union brought an action against the candidate and the station in a
North Dakota state district court. That court dismissed the action as
to the defendant station on the ground that provisions of the Federal
Communications Act rendered the station immune from prosecution
for the alleged defamation. At the same time, the court held a North
Dakota immunity statute to be unconstitutional. This point was not
assigned as error and hence was not before the North Dakota supreme court by its grant of certiorari. The supreme court affirmed,
holding that the applicable provision of the Federal Communications Act prevented any censorship by the station of political broadcasts and that Congress had thereby granted an implied immunity
from prosecution. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
in a five-four decision and held in accord with the state courts of
North Dakota that §315 grants a licensee an immunity from liability
for libelous material, the subject of a political candidate's speech,
which it broadcasts. Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
With the advent of radio on the national scene, Congress at an
early date recognized that it could either be extremely beneficial or
harmful as a means of swaying or informing the populace during
political campaigns. In an attempt to insure that this new instrumentality would be used for only legitimate political ends, Congress
enacted the Radio Act of 1927 which provides, among other things,
that any radio station granting time to a political candidate must
grant equal time under the same conditions to all other candidates
for the same office.1 A provision was included which ostensibly prevented any censorship by a station owner. This provision was for
the avowed purpose of preventing any favoritism toward any one
candidate. No provision was included nor was there an express
grant of immunity against prosecution for defamation committed
by a political candidate. A'clause similar to the provision in the
Radio Act was included in the Federal Communications Act of 19342
as follows:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imI 44 Stat. 1170 (1927), .47U.S.C. Sec. 315 (1946).
2 Ibid.
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posed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate.
The legislative history of this Act indicates that Congress intended the no-censorship provision to be absolute and to prevent the
censorship of even very obviously defamatory material from political broadcasts. 8 The basic reason for this no-censorship provision
was reiterated in later congressional hearings 4 where it was stated
that the mere threat of a law suit could be used to force a radio station to censor an opponent's speech unduly. Also, a station could
use the threatened law suit as an excuse for being partisan.5 In
view of the above no-censorship provision, it seems strange that
Congress made no provision for granting of immunity to a station
subjected to an action for defamation as a result of a political broadcast under the Act. Provisions which would have had this effect
were discussed and discarded by Congress at the time of the original
Act and subsequently. It has been suggested that the reason for the
failure of Congress to act along this line stems from a doubt as to
its authority to do so.6

In one of the first cases arising under Sec. 315 of the Act, 7 a
state court held that the no-censorship provision applied only to
words of a political or partisan nature and granted no privilege to
join and assist in the publication of a libel nor granted any immunity from the consequences of such action. Appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was denied on the ground that the case had become
moot through settlement." This was the first and for many years the
only judicial decision on the no-censorship provision of the Act.9
The effect of this decision was to give station owners limited censorship powers over the scripts of political candidates. Of course, there
could be no implied immunity with the existence of this censorship
power.
Then came the much cited and often maligned 0 decision of the
FCC of In Re Port Huron Broadcasting Co."' In this case, the station
owner, after examining the script of a political candidate as was
the practice at that time as a result of the previously mentioned Nebraska decision, discovered certain remarks of an alleged libelous
nature. Rather than censoring these remarks from the script, the
station owner denied all political candidates access to his facilities
in order to protect himself. This would seem to be allowed by the
language of Sec. 315 of the Communications Act. Two of the candidates then complained to the Commission. Probably because the
station owner had already permitted his facilities to be used by one
candidate, the Commission treated the owner's action as censorship
and ruled that the "no-censorship" provision of the Act was absolute
and meant no censorship of any variety. In order to remove some
of the "sting" from this decision, the FCC then held that Congress
3 Donnelly, Defamation by Radio; A Reconsideration, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12 (1948).
4 Hearings on S. 1333 Before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 8&th Cong. 1st Sess. 528
(1947).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
8 KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorenson, 290 U.S. 599 (1933).
9 Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union et al. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
10 Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political Candidates, 39
Va. L. Rev. 303 (1953).
11 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).

DICTA

MAY-JUNE

1960

had granted an implied immunity from prosecution under the terms
of the Act. In the words of one writer on the subject:
(The FCC) attempted to skip blithely out of this confinement by gratuitously holding that the federal government
had pre-empted the field of responsibility of station owners
for the broadcast of defamatory statements and had thus
relieved licensees of potential liability
12 for any defamatory
matter broadcast in a political speech.
A Texas station owner, aware of the uncertainties inherent in
the Port Huron decision, appealed to the federal court 13 under the
provisions of Section 402 (a) of the Communications Act. The action was dismissed on the ground that the commission's ruling was
not an appealable order under the Act. In doing so, however, the
court voiced strong disapproval of the FCC decision that a station
owner could not exercise any censorship power over the script of a
political candidate. The dicta of the court in this case 14 appears
even more interesting in view of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in the principal case.
In spite of this criticism, the FCC action of declaring the censorship provision of the Act to be absolute was in apparent agreement
with the congressional intent as indicated by the legislative history
of the Act. 15 However, the commission's action of declaring a broad
area of tort law to be pre-empted by the federal government was a
problem of constitutional law which could only be properly decided
by the courts or Congress. Although the commission's ruling was
not appealable to the courts and was not binding upon them, it possessed the practical enforcement power of being able to revoke the
license of a station owner who did not comply with its orders. At
the same time, the ruling that Congress granted an implied immunity from prosecution was a mere gratuitous action and the station
owner could rely upon it only at his peril. The magnitude of this
hazard was illustrated very graphically by the five-four decision in
the principal case. This state of affairs led to congressional hearings
on the Port Huron decision, but Congress still refused to specifically
enact an immunity clause into the Communications Act. The FCC,
reinforced by this congressional non-action, reaffirmed its position
in yet another case.16
This was the state of the law when the defamation occurred in
North Dakota. It was obvious that a clarification was necessary.
Congress had refused to act so it appeared to be up to the courts to
do so. The issues were clearly drawn. On the one side stood fair
play, common sense and that sometimes-fleeting concept called justice. On the other side stood the Constitution with its formidable
array of technical roadblocks which must be overcome in order to
12 Snyder, supra note 10, at 309.
13 Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
14 Id. at 204. ". . . we think it iudicially inconceivable that the Commission, a body of public
servants* * *, with considerations of fair play and just administration in mind, have so ordered."
15 Donnelly, supra note 3.
16 The Matter of the Application of WDSU Broadcasting Corp. File No. BR 449, 7 Pike and Fischer
Radio Reg. 769 (1952).
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pre-empt a field of state law. In fairness, however, one must realize
that the justice was not all on one side in this matter. The innocenet
victim of the defamation would also be wronged by losing his remedy against the station owner. True, the victim would still have a
right of action against the source of the defamation, but in many
situations, this remedy could be woefully inadequate.
The majority opinion in the principal case based its decision
that the censorship provision was absolute and that Congress had
granted an implied immunity from prosecution, on substantially the
same ground as the FCC in the Port Huron case. The dissenting
opinion opposed the pre-emption of state law which granted an implied immunity and at the same time agreed with the majority that
the censorship provision was absolute. This proposition had apparently never been seriously considered by any other writer on the
subject. It was stated that there was no such direct or positive
repugnancy so as to justify a striking-down of state law.
It is submitted that the majority opinion is the only one which
could have been rendered under the circumstances of this case and
that the minority opinion, although perhaps correct on technical
grounds, would have been manifestly unfair to those station owners
who, in good faith, relied upon the ruling of the governing body of
their business. At the same time, it would seem that a more liberal
policy of allowing appeals from administrative agencies to the
courts should be adopted in order to prevent such a dilemma as confronted a station owner before the decision in the principal case.
Dale H. Helm
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